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    would like to present, here today, Israel’s perspective on key aspects of 
the application of international law in connection with cyber operations, with 
a particular emphasis on issues related to the use of force and armed con-
flicts. 
The question of how international law adapts to emerging technologies 
is one of the most challenging ones faced by legal advisers. These challenges 
compel us to revisit notions that have been with us for decades, and some-
times centuries. We can see this in the fields of artificial intelligence, block-
chain, and, of course, in the context of cyber operations.  
Israel considers that international law is applicable to cyberspace, and 
this is a view that has become almost axiomatic for a vast majority of States. 
However, when seeking to apply particular legal rules to this domain, we are 
mindful of its unique features. 
These unique features shape policy and affect the legal framework appli-
cable to the cyber domain. I wish to shortly address some of them. First, 
cyber operations are conducted through a global network, passing through 
infrastructure located in multiple jurisdictions, and lack, in and of them-
selves, any meaningful physical manifestation. Second, much of the cyber 
infrastructure is held and controlled by the private sector and civilian com-
ponents are a major part of the picture. Thus, regulation of the cyber domain 
may have various social and economic implications as well. Third, the cyber 
domain is highly dynamic, given the fast pace of technological developments 
and innovation. The development of international legal rules, on the other 
hand, is a more gradual process. This is understandable since these rules are 
designed to stand the test of time and are not easily amended.   
All these factors taken together suggest that an extra layer of caution 
must be exercised in determining how exactly international legal rules apply 
to cyber operations, and in evaluating whether and how additional rules 
should be developed. We, as government and military legal advisers, are 
tasked with the role of identifying the relevant rules, including those set by 
the law of armed conflict, and determining how they apply to a particular set 
of facts. In some cases, it will be possible to apply a certain rule as it is; while 
in other cases, the situation may be conceptually different, such that it might 
not be possible, feasible, or even desirable to draw from existing legal rules. 
This process obviously has to consider the behavior of States in the cyber 












When dealing with a treaty provision, we look to the regular rules of 
treaty interpretation to ascertain the relevance and applicability of the provi-
sions at hand in the cyber context. As for customary law, it is necessary to 
examine whether there is general State practice accepted as law, substantiat-
ing the existence of a rule in the cyber domain.1 It cannot be automatically 
presumed that a customary rule applicable in any of the physical domains is 
also applicable to the cyber domain. The key question in identifying State 
practice is whether the practice which arose in other domains is closely re-
lated to the activity envisaged in the cyber domain. Additionally, it must be 
ascertained that the opinio juris which gave rise to the customary rules appli-
cable in other domains was not domain-specific.2 Given the unique charac-
teristics of the cyber domain, such an analysis is to be made with particular 
prudence, as it is very often the case that relevant differences exist. 
Since this is the Naval War College’s conference, it is only fitting that I 
will give an example from the law of maritime warfare. As you all know, the 
rules regulating maritime blockade evolved long ago. Over the years these 
rules have crystalized into customary law. Nonetheless, this custom was 
formed specifically in the maritime context. Putting aside the question of 
whether the concept of blockade is relevant to cyberspace, the maritime 
practice is not closely related to any type of activity in the cyber domain, 
while the opinio juris in this regard is domain-specific. It is therefore quite 
clear that the rules of maritime blockade are not applicable in the circum-
stances of activities in the cyber domain.  
The law of neutrality also illustrates the challenges of applying rules that 
evolved in the context of traditional warfare to the contemporary environ-
ment of cyberspace, as many of its rules were tailored specifically to the land, 
sea and air domains. For example, in relation to one of the basic overarching 
rules of neutrality—the inviolability of a neutral State’s territory—while in 
the land domain it is forbidden to transfer troops or convoys of munitions;3 
 
1. For official Israeli positions on the identification of customary international law, 
see State of Israel, ILC Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law – Is-
rael’s Comments and Observations (Jan. 18, 2018), https://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/70/ 
pdfs/english/icil_israel.pdf. 
2. For further elaboration, see, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 10, at 21–28. (Sept. 7); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G v. Den.; F.R.G. v. 
Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 79 (Feb. 20); Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. 
v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99, ¶¶ 65–79. (Feb. 3). 
3. Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and 












at sea—the passage of warships in territorial waters is possible;4 and in the 
air such passage is subject to discretion or limitations of each neutral State.5 
Given these differences, it remains unclear if and how this rule would be 
applicable in cyberspace. 
These are just some examples that show why it is not always easy to 
move from the general statement that international law applies to the cyber 
domain, to concrete legal rules that bind States and non-State actors in their 
actual behavior.  
Accordingly, the State of Israel has largely refrained thus far from making 
specific statements on whether and how particular rules apply. That is not to 
say that we take no position—indeed, we have consistently affirmed the ap-
plication of international law to cyberspace in forums like the UN GGE and 
the Open Ended Working Group. In parallel, over the last few years, we 
have been gradually formulating and developing our views on some contem-
porary issues relating to cyber operations. This is a meticulous and delicate 
process, impelled by the need for thorough legal and practical research and 
careful consideration of a multitude of views, together with an assessment 
of potential implications.  
Bearing in mind all these challenges, in my presentation today I would 
like to share with you some of the insights that we have reached thus far 
regarding international law applicable to cyber operations, particularly in 
connection with armed conflicts. My hope is that this will contribute to the 
current legal discourse in this field. 
 
II. JUS AD BELLUM 
 
I will start by addressing a few key issues concerning the jus ad bellum. First— 
and this has already been acknowledged by many others—the customary 
prohibition set out in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations,6 on 
“the threat or use of force” in international relations, is clearly applicable in 
the cyber domain.  
We share the support among States for the view that a cyber operation 
can amount to use of force if it is expected to cause physical damage, injury, 
 
4. Hague Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in 
Naval War arts. 10–11, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, 205 Consol. T.S. 395. 
5. Commission of Jurists to Consider and Report Upon the Revision of the Rules of 
Warfare, Rules of Air Warfare art. 12, Feb. 19, 1923, reprinted in 32 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 12, 16–17 (1938). 












or death, which would establish the use of force if caused by kinetic means. 
For example, hacking into the computers of the railroad network of another 
State and programming the controls in a manner that is expected to cause a 
collision between trains can amount to use of force. As with any legal assess-
ment relating to the cyber domain, as practice in this field continues to 
evolve, there may be room to further examine whether operations not caus-
ing physical damage could also amount to use of force.  
Second, when the use of force in the cyber domain, by either a State or 
non-State actor, can be considered as an actual or imminent armed attack, 
the State under attack may act in accordance with its inherent right to self-
defense, as enshrined in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.7 Of course, the ex-
ercise of this right is subject to the customary principles of necessity and 
proportionality. 
Finally, the use of force in accordance with the right of self-defense, 
against an armed attack conducted through cyber means, may be carried out 
by either cyber or kinetic means; just as use of force in self-defense against a 
kinetic armed attack may be conducted by kinetic or cyber means.  
 
III. JUS IN BELLO 
 
I would like to move on and address some key issues concerning the applica-
bility of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) to the cyber domain.  
I’ll start by stating the obvious: the law of armed conflict and its funda-
mental principles generally apply to cyber operations conducted in the con-
text of an armed conflict. Indeed, “the right of belligerents to adopt means 
of injuring the enemy is not unlimited”8 even in the cyber domain.  
Israel is a party to the four Geneva Conventions and other treaties9 gov-
erning particular aspects of conduct in armed conflict and is also bound by 
 
7. Id. art. 51 . 
8. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277. 
9. E.g., Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215; Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injuri-
ous or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol on Non-
Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), id. at 168; Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol 
II to the 1980 Convention as amended on 3 May 1996), May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93 













applicable customary law. Israel—like the United States and others—is not 
a party to the First and Second Additional Protocols to the four Geneva 
Conventions and is not bound by them as a matter of treaty law. However, 
we see the following as consistent with the relevant customary law and the 
Additional Protocols. 
One of the key issues, in the conduct of hostilities in particular, is how 
to define “attacks,” and in which circumstances cyber operations amount to 
attacks under LOAC. The concept of attack is central to targeting operations 
and only acts amounting to attacks are subject to the “targeting rules” relat-
ing to distinction, precautions, and proportionality.  
The definition of attack in LOAC requires several elements, but I will 
focus on those aspects carrying special relevance in the cyber context. Spe-
cifically, I will address the element requiring that an act will constitute an 
attack only if it is expected to cause death or injury to persons or physical 
damage to objects, beyond de minimis. 
One aspect of this element concerns the reasonably expected conse-
quences of the act in question. Reasonably expected consequences are those 
that are anticipated with some likelihood of occurrence, and entail adequate 
causal proximity to the act.  
A second aspect of this element is the type of required damage. The re-
quirement for physical damage has been accepted law since the introduction 
of the legal term of art “attack” into the LOAC discourse. For this reason, 
practices such as certain types of electronic warfare, psychological warfare, 
economic sanctions, seizure of property, and detention have never been con-
sidered to be attacks as such, and, accordingly, were not considered as sub-
ject to LOAC targeting rules.  
Only when a cyber operation is expected to cause physical damage, will 
it satisfy this element of an attack under LOAC. In the same vein, the mere 
loss or impairment of functionality to infrastructure would be insufficient in 
this regard, and no other specific rule to the contrary has evolved in the cyber 
domain.  
However, if an impediment to functionality is caused by physical dam-
age, or when an act causing the loss of functionality is a link in a chain of the 
expected physical damage, that act may amount to an attack. For example, if 
a cyber operation is intended to shut down electricity in a military airfield, 
 
U.N.T.S. 163; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the In-
volvement of Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222; Protocol Ad-
ditional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Adoption of an 












and as a result is expected to cause the crash of a military aircraft—that op-
eration may constitute an attack (subject, of course, to the additional ele-
ments for attacks under LOAC).  
The existence of physical damage is assessed purely on objective and 
technical grounds. It is a factual question and as such does not depend on 
the subjective perception or the manner in which the other side chooses to 
address the loss or impairment of functionality. 
Finally, the fact that a cyber operation is not an attack does not mean 
that no legal limitations apply thereto. Indeed, there are general obligations 
in LOAC that apply to all military operations regardless of being attacks or 
not. Central among those is the requirement to consider the danger posed to 
the civilian population in the conduct of military operations. It is widely ac-
cepted today that parties to conflicts cannot blatantly disregard such harmful 
effects to the civilian population in their military operations. But there are 
also more specific protections that may apply to actions other than attacks. 
For example, cyber operations affecting medical units are regulated and lim-
ited, inter alia, by the LOAC obligation to respect and protect medical units, 
which applies regardless of whether the act constitutes an attack or not.10  
Moving on from the issue of attack, another question which is especially 
relevant to the cyber domain is whether the term “object,” as it is understood 
in LOAC, encompasses computer data. This bears implications with regard 
to the implementation of the LOAC rules relating to distinction, precautions, 
and proportionality. 
Objects for the purposes of LOAC have always been understood to be 
tangible things and this understanding is not domain-specific. It is therefore 
our position that, under the law of armed conflict, as it currently stands, only 
tangible things can constitute objects. 
Here, again, this does not mean that cyber operations adversely affecting 
computer data are unregulated. In particular, when an operation involving 
the deletion or alteration of computer data is still reasonably expected to 
cause physical damage to objects or persons and fulfills the other elements 
required to constitute an attack, the operation would be subject to LOAC 
targeting rules. Likewise, one must have regard to rules, which are not de-
pendent on the concept of objects, such as the obligation to respect and 
protect medical units. 
 
10. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and 












IV. OBSERVATIONS ON OTHER LEGAL ISSUES PERTINENT TO       
CYBER OPERATIONS 
 
Now, in addition to the jus ad bellum and LOAC, there are other legal frame-
works pertinent to cyber operations that do not center on armed conflicts. 
Given their importance, I believe it is valuable to address them shortly, and 
perhaps leave some room for further thought.  
I will start by addressing perhaps the broadest topic, which continues to 
be a subject of vibrant discussion: sovereignty. To begin with, there are di-
verging views regarding whether sovereignty is merely a principle, from 
which legal rules are derived, or a binding rule of international law in itself, 
the violation of which could be considered an internationally wrongful act. 
This issue has many facets, and while I will not offer any definitive position 
for the time being, I would like to stress a number of important points. 
The first is that sovereignty is a cornerstone of international law and in-
ternational relations. Of course, we need to distinguish, in this regard, be-
tween sovereignty, which is typically used as a general concept that connotes 
independence, and “territorial sovereignty,” which is an international legal 
rule. States will sometimes point to the need to protect their sovereignty, 
referring broadly to their political will and autonomy, without necessarily re-
ferring to a legal rule. The two meanings are sometimes conflated, and we 
need to be very careful when drawing legal conclusions. 
A second, and related, point is that States undoubtedly have sovereign 
interests in protecting cyber infrastructure and data located in their territory. 
However, States may also have legitimate sovereign interests with respect to 
data outside their territory. For example, as governments store more and 
more of their data by using cloud services provided by third parties, whose 
servers are located abroad, how do we describe the interest that they have in 
relation to that data? Would the interest in protecting the data not be a sov-
ereign interest in this case as well? Or, alternatively, when a State conducts a 
criminal investigation and needs to access data located abroad from its own 
territory, under what circumstances does it need to request the consent of 
the territorial State? Of course, there are no easy answers to these questions, 
and some of them are currently being discussed, such as in the context of 
the protocol to the Budapest Cybercrime Convention currently being nego-
tiated to address this very topic.11  
 
11. In this regard, see Enhanced International Cooperation on Cybercrime and Electronic Evi-













These questions reflect an inherent tension between States’ legitimate 
interest and the concept of territorial sovereignty, as we understand it in the 
physical world. In practice, States occasionally do conduct cyber activities 
that transit through, and target, networks and computers located in other 
States, for example for national defense, cybersecurity, or law enforcement 
purposes. Under existing international law, it is not clear whether these types 
of actions are violations of the rule of territorial sovereignty, or perhaps that 
our understanding of territorial sovereignty in cyberspace is substantively 
different from its meaning in the physical world. 
Another matter closely related to the issue of sovereignty is that of non-
intervention. Traditionally, this concept has been understood as having a 
high threshold. It has been taken to mean that State A cannot take actions 
to “coerce” State B in pursuing a course of action, or refraining from a 
course of action, in matters pertaining to State B’s core internal affairs, such 
as its economic or foreign policy choices. Its traditional application has fo-
cused on military intervention and support to armed groups seeking the 
overthrow of the regime in another State. This could presumably also relate 
to support given to armed groups in the cyber domain, such as providing 
information regarding cyber vulnerabilities of the State. 
A more recent issue that has come to the fore relates to interference in 
national elections. We concur with the various positions expressed in this 
regard, such as that which was presented by former U.S. State Department 
Legal Adviser Brian J. Egan, and more recently reiterated by U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense General Counsel Paul C. Ney Jr., that a “cyber operation 
by a State that interferes with another country’s ability to hold an election or 
that manipulates another country’s election results would be a clear violation 
of the rule of non-intervention.”12  
I will now turn into addressing three somewhat related topics: due dili-
gence, attribution and countermeasures. 
The concept of due diligence means that States should take reasonable 
measures to avoid or minimize harm to other States, and seems to be useful 
 
12. Brian J. Egan, International Law and Stability in Cyberspace, 35 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 169 (2017). Paul C. Ney Jr., General Counsel, U.S. Department of 














in fields such as international environmental law. In the 2015 UN GGE Re-
port,13 the concept was addressed as the basis for a voluntary, non-binding 
norm of responsible State behavior, providing that States should not allow 
their territory to be used for the commission of international wrongful acts. 
There was wisdom in mentioning it in the chapter covering norms of re-
sponsible State behavior, as it does not, at this point in time, translate into a 
binding rule of international law in the cyber context. This was the position 
expressed by other States as well. 
As I mentioned regarding the examples of maritime blockade and neu-
trality, we have to be careful in applying to the cyber domain rules that 
emerged in a different, distinct context. For instance, in the field of environ-
mental law, where much of the focus and application of due diligence obli-
gations has been in recent years, the acting State typically has control, or at 
least oversight, over the harmful activity (for example, regulating a polluting 
power plant). However, cyberspace is mostly private and decentralized. 
The inherently different features of cyberspace—its decentralization and 
private characteristics—incentivize cooperation between States on a volun-
tary basis, such as with the case of national Computer Emergency Response 
Teams (CERTs). CERTs are already doing what could arguably fall into that 
category: exchanging information with one another, as well as cooperating 
with each other in mitigating incidents. However, we have not seen wide-
spread State practice beyond this type of voluntary cooperation, and certainly 
not practice grounded in some overarching opinio juris, which would be in-
dispensable for a customary rule of due diligence, or something similar to 
that, to form.  
The issue of attribution is also widely debated with respect to cyber op-
erations. Some have suggested that there needs to be more legal certainty 
with respect to attribution, in order to avoid mistaken attribution, which can 
lead to conflict escalation. This is increasingly becoming more of a theoreti-
cal issue. Over time, the attribution capabilities of States have improved, and 
even States with lesser capabilities have been able to rely on solid infor-
mation provided by other States and by the private sector. In any event, this 
 
13. Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (2015), trans-
mitted by Letter dated 26 June 2015 from the Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts 
on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security Established Pursuant to Resolution 68/243 (2014), ¶ 13(c), U.N. Doc. 












is a technical matter—a factual one—and I would advise against over-regu-
lating the issue . 
That being said, there is also the question of public perceptions—be-
cause sometimes, when an offensive cyber operation is public, and the at-
tribution is public, the government needs to communicate with its citizens, 
and with the international community at large, in order for its positions and 
actions to be understood. But there will be cases when a State will prefer not 
to disclose the attack, the attribution, or any ensuing actions taken—for di-
verse reasons such as national security and foreign relations. Either way, as 
a matter of international law, the choice whether or not to disclose the at-
tribution information remains at the exclusive discretion of the State. 
With respect to the issue of countermeasures, I would like to echo the 
positions taken by the United Kingdom,14 the United States,15 and other 
States, to the effect that there is no absolute duty under international law to 
notify the responsible State in advance of a cyber-countermeasure. Prior no-
tification is perhaps more realistic and practical in fields such as international 
trade, allowing the responsible State to reconsider its actions without frus-
trating the ability of the injured State to take the intended countermeasures. 
However, in the cyber domain, where the pace of events can be extremely 
fast and the other side may thwart the action if it anticipates it, announcing 
a cyber-countermeasure in advance would often negate its utility and effec-
tiveness, and in some instances undermine the interests of the injured State, 
as well as render the countermeasure obsolete.  
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
One last point: I have focused thus far on cyber operations, but it is im-
portant to keep in mind that the application of international law to cyber-
space is much broader than the issues I touched upon. Questions relating to 
cybersecurity, cybercrime, digital trade, and human rights in the cyber do-
main, are just a few examples. I think that international law has a crucial role 
to play in addressing these topics. By focusing on these topics, international 
law can contribute to enhancing global stability in a concrete way. We hope 
to share our views on these and other topics as well in due course.  
 
14. Jeremy Wright, UK Attorney General, Keynote Address at the Chatham House 
Royal Institute for International Affairs: Cyber and International Law on the 21st Century, 
GOV.UK (May 23, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-interna-
tional-law-in-the-21st-century.   












I wish to conclude my remarks by taking a step back. In the discussions 
that we are having on the application of international law in dealing with 
emerging technologies, I think that the challenges lie not in identifying the 
basic rules of international law—the prohibition on the use of force, self-
defense, non-intervention, territorial sovereignty, etc.—but in determining 
when and how they apply in new circumstances. Picture the land, air, and sea 
domains of international law as independent trees, each with its own 
branches and leaves, each yielding its own fruit. Each of these trees is sus-
tained by common ingredients—soil, water, sunlight—yet each tree grows 
differently, depending on the external conditions, the type of seeds sown and 
how the roots grow. We now have a new tree whose roots are just beginning 
to take shape—international law of cyber operations is a nascent field. It is 
emerging from the same grounds of international law, the same core princi-
ples at the heart of the international system, and its leaves and fruits will bear 
some similarities to the other fields of law—but we do not expect that it will 
be identical, once fully grown. So, while the vast majority of States agree on 
the starting point of the application of international law to cyber operations, 
the international community is still very much at the beginning of the journey 
and the applicability of each existing rule of international law to the cyber 
domain requires careful assessment and review. 
 
